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Abstract: Health care providers are almost always universally reimbursed by
third party purchasers. As a result, health care purchasers are faced with risk
selection challenges. In response, risk adjustment methods are introduced in the
reimbursement for services. However, health care providers under this arrangement
have incentives to manipulate the risk elements in an attempt to obtain larger
payments from the purchasers i.e. the realisation of risk adjuster then becomes
sensitive to the providers￿upcoding behaviour. Whilst there is usually an outside
auditor (e.g from the o¢ ce of inspector general of the department of health and
human services in the United States) who randomly monitors providers￿beahviour
and imposes penalty in the event that dishonesty is detected, monitoring such
behaviour is highly costly. In this paper, we propose a reward scheme to combat
such moral hazard problems. We analyse two types of incentive schemes where
treatment intensity is contractible in one and not in the other. We show that under
1The paper was presented at the 2009 iHEA Congress in Beijing. We thank Karl Claxton, Hugh
Gravelle, Neil Rickman, Luigi Siciliani and the conference participants of the iHEA congress for
many useful comments. All the remaining errors are ours of course.
2Corresponding author.
1both incentive schemes, the honest provider receives the same reward and obtains
higher expected utility in comparison to the full information case. Further, with
contractible treatment intensity, the contract resembles the full information one.
Keywords: Upcoding, Asymmetric Information, Health Contracts, Risk Ad-
juster, Treatment Intensity
JEL Classi￿cation: I11, D82
21. INTRODUCTION
Health care providers in the developed nations are almost always universally
reimbursed by third party purchasers. In the UK National Health Services (NHS)
primary care, the approaches to reimburse providers include the introduction of
capitation with monitoring of provider￿ s performance. The primary care trusts and
general practices are funded through the arrangement of capitation based on the
resource allocation formulas that take into account demographic factors such as
sex and age (Carr-Hill and Sheldon, 1992). Under US health care system, ￿xed
budgets and monitoring of performance are widely adopted as well to improve
the e¢ ciency of health care provision. Under the US approache of reimbursing
providers, diagnosis-based risk adjustment methods are developed to measure the
di⁄erence in case-mix and morbidity of primary care population. It is well known
that the primary purpose of risk adjustment method is to help ensure that morbidity
of individual patient is taken into account in the budget allocation. However, with
the use of risk adjustment method, the primary care trusts or general practitioners
may have less incentives to treat patients with complex health needs (i.e. ￿ dumped￿
in the terminology of Ma, 1994) or to choose to treat patients with less complex
health problems (i.e. cream-skimming, Barros, 2003).
The data elements used in the risk adjustment systems such as age, sex, and
diagnoses, are routinely collected from the administrative records. They therefore
su⁄er from challenges such as incomplete or inaccurate coding of diagnostic data.
One major concern with the risk adjustment approach is therefore the possibility
for upcoding. Upcoding occurs when health care providers engage in strategic be-
havior by manipulating information about diagnoses or reclassifying diagnoses in
an attempt to increase risk-adjusted capitation payment to the providers (Weiner et
al, 1996). The fact that informational asymmetry between physicians and patients
gives providers an informational advantage has long been recognised by Arrow as he
writes: "Because medical knowledge is so complicated, the information possessed
by the physician as to the consequences and possibilities of treatment is necessarily
3very much greater than that of the patient, or at least as it is believed by both
parties. Further, both parties are aware of this informational inequality, and their
relation is colored by this knowledge" (Arrow, 1963, page 951). McGuire (2000)
has also noted that upcoding gives rise to physician￿ s information advantage and
generates market power.
The problem of upcoding is aggravated by the fact that it is di¢ cult to pinpoint
the provider￿ s discretion to engage in upcoding as there are various ways in which
coding errors can occur. O￿ Malley et al (2005) examined the potential sources of
errors occurring in the international classi￿cation of disease (ICD) coding process.
They discussed that the errors along the ￿ patient trajectory￿relate to the commu-
nication among patients and providers: The quality and quantity of information
exchanged between patients and admitting clerks or treating clinicians, the clini-
cian￿ s knowledge and experience with illness, and the clinician￿ s attention to detail
are all critical determinants of coding accuracy. In addition, coding errors can also
occur in the recording procedures along the ￿ paper trail￿ , e.g. error sources include
errors occuring in electronic and written records, coder training and experience,
facility quality control e⁄orts, and unintentional and intentional coder errors.
In this paper, we analyse how tendencies towards upcoding by the healthcare
providers alter the nature of optimal contracts between providers and purchasers, as
upcoding behavior is essentially non-veri￿able and hence non-contractible. In the
contract between the purchaser and the provider, the purchaser￿ s payo⁄ is usually
based on the realization of risk adjuster that is observable to all parties. It is well
known, from the derivation of risk adjuster, that diagnostic codes with expensive
illness will result in higher values of adjusters and hence, more payment3. The
realization of the risk adjuster however depends not only upon the nature of illness
but also upon the degree of upcoding behavior.
At ￿rst it seems that an obvious solution to the upcoding problem will be to
invest in resources for auditing coding procedures and use that information in the
3ACG Morbidity Index could be used as an example of the risk adjuster. In the next section,
we will brie￿y introduce how the index is created, based on the diagnostic information from ACG
system.
4contract. If coding behavior can observed by the purchaser, he or she is able to force
the provider to record honestly the diagnostic codes and hence the ￿rst best will be
achieved. For example, Weiner et al (1996) implied that one of the remedies for such
upcoding behavior is ￿ the adoption of auditing and enforcement procedures designed
to identify the most obvious examples of coding gaming.￿However, full observation
of the coding behavior is so costly that it is almost impossible to implement. The
purchaser therefore will have to resort to some alternative incentive mechanism to
alleviate such moral hazard problems based on available pieces of information.
The main feature of this paper is to use, instead of a direct punishment scheme, a
potential reward scheme to induce honest recording of diagnistic codes. We assume
that there is an ￿ external￿auditor who randomly audits the upcoding behavior. We
assume that the auditor is able to observe the provider￿ s behaviour with a certain
probability and the provider is punished if any upcoding behaviour is detected. The
dishonest provider therefore faces a threat of an exogenously imposed punishment
if caught by an external auditor, the value of which is known to all parties. In
this paper, we consider the value of this punishment as the potential reward that
can be awarded to the honest provider. This trade-o⁄ between punishment and
potential reward is quite crucial in our model as purchasers use this ￿ carrot and
stick￿ approach to induce honest behaviour. We show that in equilibrium this
reward scheme eliminates any incentives for upcoding as the honest provider receives
larger expected utility than the dishonest provider does.
Our assumptions about the presence of an external auditor and exogenous pun-
ishment are consistent with fact that the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
O¢ ce of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Services
or DOJ) often use the Federal false claims acts as a means to prevent fraudulent
claims in the health care inductry (see e.g. Lorence et al 2002 and Salcido 2003).4
The use of such punishment and reward schemes are quite usual practices in the
health care industry. The potential penalties for upcoding behavior could stem
4According to Lorence et al. (2001, page 423) improper payments due to misreporting can
cost the government as much as $12 billion implying that the government has clear incentives to
prevent such behaviour through appropriate punishment. In fact, in some cases penalties can be
as harsh as imposing prison sentences.
5from the threat of government prosecution or result from the concerns about the
damage to providers￿reputation. The potential rewards of coding health care in-
formation used on reimbursement and the risk of discovery have been widely inves-
tigated by authors like Silverman and Skinner 2001, Cleverley 1999, and Kleimuntz
et al 1999. In their study investigating Medicare upcoding and market structure
in for-pro￿t and non-for-pro￿t hospitals, Silverman and Skinner (2001) discussed
the consequences of upcoding behavior, using the concepts developed in the tax
evasion literature which is based on the Becker model of crime and punishment
(Becker, 1968). They recognized that ￿ there is a gain in terms of increased revenues
from aggressive upcoding, but there is also the risk of detection and subsequent
punishment.￿
Our assumptions about the presence of an external auditor and exogenous pun-
ishment are also similar to that found in the standard costly state veri￿cation mod-
els, for example, Townsend (1979). Concerns about information manipulation have
also drawn widespread attention in ￿nancial and accounting literature. Empirical
studies provided evidence that performance-based compensation provides managers
with incentives to manipulate information in order to increase their payment at a
cost to shareholders (see for example Burns and Kedia (2005), Bergstresser and
Philippon (2005), Johnson et al. (2005), Sadka (2006), and Goldman et al (2006)).
We consider two payment methods adopted by the purchaser. In the ￿rst
method, the purchaser reimburses the provider based only on the observed real-
ization of the risk adjuster, where the risk of punishment is the instrument used
to alleviate moral hazard. In the second one, the purchaser￿ s payo⁄ depends not
only upon the risk adjuster but also upon the treatment intensity5. This approach
requires that the provider must deliver the treatment package that is relevant to
diagnoses which provides, besides the trade o⁄ between potential reward and pun-
ishment, another channel to reduce the motivation for recording diagnostic codes
dishonestly. Indeed, the provider has to spend resources that are contingent upon
the diagnoses, regardless of whether they are recorded honestly or dishonestly. That
5See Chalkley and Khalil (2005) and Siciliani (2006) for the example using treatment intensity
into the payment design.
6is, the payo⁄ resulting from upcoding behavior must be spent on the treatment ac-
tivities rather than contributing to the provider￿ s pro￿t.
The paper is organised as follows: After giving a brief description about risk
adjustment system in section 2, we propose our model in section 3. Section 4
provides the full information benchmark. Sections 5 and 6 consider the asymmetric
information contracts under two di⁄erent settings: one with contractible treatment
intensity (section 5) and one without (section 6). Section 7 concludes.
2. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE ACG SYSTEM AND THE ACG
MORBIDITY INDEX
The most intensive research on risk adjustment is concentrated on diagnosis-
based methods. A leading risk adjustment system, called Adjusted Clinical Group
(ACG), has been developed by Jonathan Weiner and colleagues at Johns Hopkins
University (Buntin and Newhouse, 1998). The ACG system has been applied to
adjust capitation payment rates and for physician pro￿ling in the United States
(see, for example, Adams et al 2002 and Knutson 1998) and Canada (see, for
example, Reid et al 2002 and Verhulst et al 2001). In Canada, this case-mix system
has been validated as a predictor of subsequent health care expenditures by Reid
and his colleagues in Manitoba and British Columbia (Reid et al, 1999 and 2002).
Hutchison et al (2006) applied this system to assess the usability of neighbourhood
level variations in illness burden.
Johns Hopkins ACG case-mix system is applied to characterize population ill-
ness burden at the small area level. This system categorizes diagnostic information
from administrative health records (e.g. ICD-9/ICD-9-CM) into 32 clinically mean-
ingful groups (ADGs) based on expected clinical outcomes and resource uses. These
32 ADGs are then further collapsed into 12 ￿ collapsed￿ADGs (CADGs). According
to the combination of CADGs and the individual￿ s age/sex structure, the individ-
ual is assigned one of Adjuster Clinical Groups (ACGs) that are mutually exclusive
terminal groups.
7ACG Morbidity Index was created by Reid and co-worker (Reid et al, 1999
and 2002) to convert the ACG assignment at an individual level to a population-
based measure of health need, which therefore can be used as the measure of a risk
adjuster for the purpose of reimbursement. This approach ￿rst assigns ACGs to
the users in each cluster. The expected costs were then obtained by assigning ACG
costs (illness weights) that were derived from actual resources used by the users
in the ACG category. Hutchison et al (2006) applied and assessed this measure in
Ontario scenario. They concluded that the index generated by the ACG case-mix
adjustment system can be used to assess the relative need for primary care services
and for health services planning at the neighborhood and local community level.
3. THE MODEL
We consider a health care provider who provides health care services to patients
within a certain speci￿ed area during a particular time horizon, say one year. The
area could either be a small geographic area, a health plan or a primary care
trust. Given particular medical conditions, the provider records diagnostic codes
and chooses the appropriate treatment strategies. The purchaser converts all of the
diagnostic codes for all patients within the time period into a summary measure of
medical conditions. For the purpose of explanation, we consider ACG Morbidity
Index (AMI) as the measure for such medical condition. 6
Although AMI is a stochastic variable, its realization is measurable as explained
above. The purchaser reimburses the provider for his services based on the value of
the realization, denoted by x; where the realization of x can take any value within
the compact interval [x;x]: As AMI indicates the illness burden of patients, higher
values of AMI imply worse health status and vice versa. That is, patients with x
have the worst health status, while those with x have the best. Formally, the payo⁄
t = t(x).
The provider￿ s preference is represented by the utility function U(t;y). The
6There are other evidence-based instruments used to measure population medical conditions for
the purpose of reimbursement (see, for example, the summary reviews by Buntin and Newhouse,
1998).
8variable y measures the treatment intensity. The treatment intensity corresponds
to the diagnostic codes, based on which AMI is created. The intensity variable y
can be thought of as an index measurement characterizing all treatment episodes
delivered by the provider within the particular time period. Therefore, the intensity
index y is also the function of x, say y = y(x). We assume that the provider￿ s utility
increases in the payo⁄ t(x) and decreases in the intensity index y(x). Speci￿cally,
we assume that Ut(t;y) > 0; Utt(t;y) < 0; Uy(t;y) < 0 and Uyy(t;y) < 0. We also
assume that the provider￿ s utility at the boundary value, i.e. at x = x, is not less
than zero. Precisely, U(t;y) ￿ 0; where t = t(x) and y = y (x). This assumption
ensures that health care services could be provided to the patients with the worst
medical conditions.
The purchaser is concerned about the patients￿health gain resulting from the
consumptions of the health care services. Patients with AMI x receiving treatment
intensity y will have a gain in health status, say h(x;y). We assume that the
purchasers￿bene￿t from health care service is directly related to the patients￿health
gain i.e. b(x;y) ￿ b(h(x;y)). Further, we assume that the bene￿t increases and is
strictly concave in y and decreases in x: by(x;y) > 0; byy(x;y) < 0 and bx(x;y) <
0. The assumption bx(x;y) < 0 implies, for a given a treatment intensity, that
worse the patient￿ s medical conditions are, the lower is the bene￿t. The purchaser
maximizes the bene￿t from consuming health care services minus the monetary
transfers to the provider, namely, V = b(x;y) ￿ t(x):
To simplify the moral hazard problem, we assume that the provider￿ s upcoding
behaviour is represented by the variable a taking binary values 0 and 1: i.e. a =
f0;1g, where a = 1 implies that the provider exerts upcoding, whilst a = 0 indicates
￿ no upcoding￿(i.e. exhibits honest behaviour). The variable x is then distributed
with conditional distribution function F(xja), and the density function f(xja), that
depend not only upon the nature of medical conditions but also upon the variable
a.
In our model, a public inspector, such as the ones employed by the United
States Department of Justice (DoJ) and/or the O¢ ce of Inspector General (OIG)
9of the Department of Health and Human Services, is introduced to catch the up-
coding behaviour.7 Thus, auditing does not cost the purchaser anything directly
in this model.8 We assume that performance of the public inspector is imperfect:
perfect auditing that entails the ￿rst best solution by eliminating any dishonest
behaviour requires auditing with a very high probability that is extremely costly to
implement. Instead, DoJ or OIG can only inspect provider￿ s claims randomly and
hence upcoding behavior will be caught only with a probability. We assume that
the audit probablities are known by both the purchaser and the provider.9 Thus
in our model, punishment can be treated as an exogenous variable with a known
(expected) value as it is imposed by an external organization (e.g. DOJ) rather
than the purchaser. We denote this value of (potential) punishment by  10.




U (t;y)f(xj0)dx ￿ 0
Z x
x
U (t;y)f(xj1)dx ￿ 0






U (t;y)f(xj1)dx +  
Note that the meaning of the incentive compatibility constraint is quite di⁄erent
in our context: In contrast to the standard theory that focuses on the trade-o⁄ be-
7For instance, the O¢ ce of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services
has implemented the Federal False Claims Act in order to prevent fraudulent claims in health care
industry (see, for example, Lorence et. al (2002) and Salcido (2003)).
8The issue of collusion between the auditor and the provider can be safely ignored in this
model: since the public inspector is hired by the Government directly (and there is no contractual
relationship between the auditor and the purchaser), we can safely assume that only honest
auditors are hired by the Federal bodies otherwise the government￿ s reputaion will be at stake.
9Similarly, the issue of non-commitment to auditing strategies (i.e. non-commitment to audit
probabilities) does not arise in this model either.
10Note, according to the assumption that an outside auditor monitors randomly and that up-
coding behaviour is caught with a certain probability,   in fact represents an expected value of
punishment.
10tween inducing higher degree of e⁄ort and the costs (or agent￿ s disutility) resulting
from performing the e⁄ort (e.g. La⁄ont and Martimort, 2002), here the upcoding
behaviour is the ￿ e⁄ort￿the purchaser hopes to avoid. The value of the potential
punishment is assumed to be known to both the purchaser and the provider. The
incentive compatibility constraint ensures that the expected utility of the honest
provider must not be less than the expected utility of a dishonest provider plus the
value of the potential punishment. Thus, this incentive compatibility constraint im-
plies the purchaser will reward the honest provider in order to induce zero upcoding
behaviour. 11 While, we acknowledge that setting up this monitoring system will
incur ￿xed costs, without any loss of generality, we ignore this ￿xed setting up cost
as it does not alter our results.
To investigate the incentive e⁄ect of the mechanism, we consider two types
of contractual environments. In the ￿rst one, the payment scheme is based on
the realization of x and the treatment intensity is contractible, which means the
intensity index y must be contingent upon the realization of x. The contract requires
implicitly a monitoring system that ensures the resources used are consistent with
the recorded diagnoses.12 In the second one, the payment scheme is based on the
realization of x but the treatment intensity is not contractible, which for instance is
determined based on medical professionals￿experiences during the previous periods.
The timing of the game is as follows. To start with, the purchaser designs a
contract to induce honest behavior. If the provider chooses to accept the contract,
he will decide whether or not to conduct upcoding and will treat patients with the
chosen treatment intensities. Finally, the contracts are implemented. For the ￿rst
contract, payment is based on both the realization of x and the treatment intensity
y, and for the second contract, payment is made based on the realization of x.
11We show that in equilibrium, the honest provider receives the expected utility of exactly  
(  > 0) whilst the dishonest one receives zero expected utility (see sections 5 and 6)
12In practice, the monitoring is conducted by comparing medical records with the use of resource
records.
114. THE FULL INFORMATION BENCHMARK
In this case, since the provider￿ s behavior is perfectly observable, the purchaser
will require the provider to behave honestly. The distribution of x is hence a⁄ected
only by the nature of the patients￿medical conditions which are under scrutiny.
We denote the (unconditional) density function by f(x). The purchaser￿ s problem
is to maximize the expected bene￿t subject to the participation constraint that
ensures that the provider is willing to provide the necessary care services. Namely,









U (t;y)f (x)dx ￿ 0
Since in the purchaser￿ s objective function the transfer t(x) reduces her bene￿ts
and the provider￿ s expected utility increases in t(x), the purchaser will design the
payment scheme such that participation constraint is binds: this is also veri￿ed in
the proof of proposition 1 in the appendix. The properties of the optimal solution
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given that the provider￿ s upcoding behavior is observable, the
purchaser is able to design an optimal contract such that:
1. The ￿rst best trajectories of transfer t(x) and intensity index y(x) are deter-
mined by the following conditions:





U (t;y)f (x)dx = 0
2. Given the assumption that provider￿ s ex-post utility is not negative when the
realization of x reaches upper limit (i.e. x = x), his ex-post utility function
12at the optimal is non-decreasing in x. That is, for any x 2 [x;x],
dU (t;y)
dx
￿ 0 if U ￿ 0
= 0 if U = 0










> 0 if byx(x;y) > 0
< 0 if byx(x;y) < 0
Proof. See the Appendix.
Part 1 of the proposition states that the ￿rst best trajectory must satisfy the
necessary condition that the marginal bene￿t of the treatment must be equal to the
marginal rate of substitution between intensity y(x) and transfer t(x). When the
boundary value U is larger than zero, the provider￿ s utility monotonically increases
in the realization of x, which indicates that the provider has the motivation in
treating patients with worse medical conditions. Had the boundary value been set
to zero, the ex-post utility would be extracted to zero for all values of x. Recall that
byx indicates the change of marginal bene￿t resulting from treatment in medical
conditions. Therefore, byx > 0 implies treating patients with worse medical condi-
tions will produce more marginal bene￿t (or more marginal health status gain for
population). Part 3 reveals that, while both of t(x) and y(x) change with x in the
same direction, their slopes depend on the sign of byx. If the marginal bene￿t from
treatment is larger for those with worse medical conditions the contract will allow
more transfer to the provider, along with more intensive treatment, who provides
services to patients with worse conditions. Similarly, if the marginal bene￿t from
treatment decreases in x the payo⁄ also decreases in x.
Obviously, the purchaser in practice prefers the former to the latter. We there-
after restrict our discussion on the case where treating worse patients results in a
larger marginal bene￿t. Formally, we assume the purchaser￿ s preference is charac-
13terized by byx > 013.
5. ASYMMETRY OF INFORMATION￿ CONTRACTIBLE TREATMENT
INTENSITY
We now consider the situation where recording behavior is not observable to
the purchaser. If the ￿rst best contract were to be o⁄ered, the provider would
have an incentive to exert upcoding behavior that results in the right skew in AMI
















U (t;y)f(xj1)dx +  
where the ￿rst constraint is the participation constraint that says that the
provider￿ s expected utility cannot be less than zero, while the second constraint
is the incentive compatibility constraint that ensures that the provider￿ s expected
utility with no upcoding behaviour must not be less than that with upcoding.14
Solution to the above problem is summarized in proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract o⁄ered
to the provider with ex-post utility U (t;y) entails:
1. The ￿rst best outcome for a provider with ex-post utility U (t;y)￿ : That is,
given the boundary condition U ￿  ; all features stated in proposition 1still
hold except that
13Henceforth, we restrict our discussion on the case where byx > 0 as this is, in practice,
purchaser￿ s preference. Similar approach could be applied to the assumption of byx < 0:
14Another participation constraint is
R x
x U (t;y)f(xj0)dx ￿ 0: We can check if this holds in
equilibrium.
142. The optimal trajectories t(x) and y(x) are now determined by:





U (t;y)f (xj0)dx =  
Proof. See Appendix 4.B.
There are two scenarios to the solution characterized by this proposition. In the
￿rst scenario, the provider is characterized by the ex-post utility function U(t;y)
and the information structure is asymmetric, while the second one is the full infor-
mation contract o⁄ered to the provider with ex-post utility function U(t;y) minus
 . In other words, the ￿rst best contract designed for the provider with ex-post
utility U(t;y) ￿   can get rid of the moral hazard problem associated with the
provider with ex-post utility U(t;y). To see that, rewrite the equation in part 1 as:
Z x
x
[U (t;y) ￿  ]f (xj0)dx = 0
Then de￿ne the following utility function:
W (t;y) = U (t;y) ￿  
Because Wt (t;y) ￿ Ut (t;y) and Wy (t;y) ￿ Uy (t;y); the solution (i.e. the equa-
tions in part 2 of proposition 2) are further rewritten as:





W (t;y)f (xj0)dx = 0
As indicated in proposition 1, these equations entail the ￿rst best mechanism
for the provider with ex-post utility W (t;y).
Figure 5-1 indicates how the trajectories t(x) and y(x) are distorted in the










presence of moral hazard, compared to the full information case. From the de￿nition
of W(t;y), we learn that, in t￿y space, the indi⁄erence curve of U(t;y) is on North-
West side of W(t;y)15: U(t;y) stands for the indi⁄erence curve with moral hazard
and W(t;y) for that with full information. For a given realization of x, any intensity
index, say y0(x), corresponds to transfers tA (x) on the curve W(t;y) and tB (x)
on the curve U(t;y). As tB (x) > tA (x); this indicates that the asymmetry of
information distorts transfer towards the provider if he exerts honest behaviour.
That is to say, the purchaser in the presence of moral hazard will make more
transfers to the provider in an attempt to induce the honest behaviour. Similarly,
any transfer, say t0 (x), corresponds to two intensity indices yA (x); yB (x) with
yA (x) > yB (x). Synthetically, the second best outcomes in the presence of moral
hazard are characterized by raising transfers to the provider and reducing treatment
intensity, compared to the full information scenario.
We can understand the distortion by investigating the constraints. Binding par-
ticipation and incentive compatibility constraints for the dishonest provider implies,








U (t;y)f (xj0)dx =  
i.e. the honest provider￿ s expected utility must be equal to   rather than zero
as under the full information case. The additional utility gain must result from
more transfer or less treatment intensity or both.
6. ASYMMETRY OF INFORMATION￿ NON-CONTRACTIBLE
TREATMENT INTENSITY
When the treatment is not contractible, transfer arrangement is the only instru-
ment for the purchaser to cope with moral hazard. The determination of treatment
intensity depends upon the provider￿ s professional experiences. Professional rep-
utation may be the main consideration in choosing treatment intensity. In this









U (t;Y )f(xj1)dx ￿ 0
Z x
x
U (t;Y )f(xj0)dx ￿
Z x
x
U (t;Y )f(xj1)dx +  
where the treatment intensity Y is assumed to be of constant value.
As in the previous section, the ￿rst constraint is a participation constraint for
the dishonest provider and the second one is incentive compatibility constraint. The
participation constraint for the honest provider is omitted. To solve this problem
we ￿rst introduce the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Given that the density functions f (xj0) and f (xj1) satisfy the Monotone






> 0; there exists a value of x;




> > > > <
> > > > :
< 1 if x 2 [x;x0)
= 1 if x = x0
> if x 2 (x0;x]
Proof. See in the Appendix.
According to Proposition 2 by Milgrom (1981), 0the family of densities has the
strict MLRP i⁄ x1 > x2 implies that x1 is more favorable than x2:0 The assumption
that f (xj0) and f (xj1) satisfy MLRP indicates that the distribution conditional
upon behaviour 1 is skewed to the right. Lemma 1 implies f (xj1) crosses f (xj0)
only once. The solution to the above maximization problem is summarized in
proposition 3.
Proposition 3. In the presence of moral hazard the optimal contract with non-
contractible treatment intensity entails that:











U (t;Y )f (xj0)dx =  
Z x
x
U (t;Y )f (xj1)dx = 0
2. Given that MLRP holds, there exists a value of x; say x0 2 (x;x); such that:
tSB (x)
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
< t￿ (x) if x < x0
= t￿ (x) if x = x0
> t￿ (x) if x > x0
where t￿ (x) and tSB (x) are the ￿rst and second best trajectories respectively.
Proof. See in the Appendix.
18This proposition indicates that the second best trajectory tSB (x) is distorted
in favour of the provider who delivers services to patients with worse medical con-




tSB|x<x0 tSB|x>x0 tSB|x=x0 = tD t
B A
C
Point A corresponds the case that x = x0, where the ￿rst best transfer is equal
to the second best transfer, i.e. t￿ (x0) = tSB (x0). If x < x0, 1
Ut is on the left side
of A, say point B, where the value of 1
Ut is less than that at A. Correspondingly,
tSB (x)jx<x0 < t￿ (x). Similarly, at point C, the value of 1
Ut is larger than that at
A and tSB (x)jx<x0 > t￿ (x):
Figure 5-3 presents the optimal trajectory for the transfer t(x) under full and
asymmetric information. The provider receives less transfer if x < x0 and more if
x > x0, compared to the full information case. This contract distorts transfer in
favour of those who provide services to patients with worse medical conditions.
This payment arrangement results in the incentive e⁄ect that induces honest
behaviour. Under the asymmetry of information, the provider who behaves honestly
is rewarded by receiving an expected utility that is equal to  , whilst under the full
information his expected utility is brought down to zero. Formally, the expected
19utility under asymmetric information is given by
R x
x U (t;Y )f (xj0)dx =   and,
that under full information is given by
R x
x U (t;Y )f (xj0)dx = 016:
Figure 5-3





For Ut (t;Y ) > 0, in comparison with the ￿rst best case, this contract charac-
terizes that the ex-post utility curve is steeper. That is to say, the ex-post utility
increases for any x 2 (x0;x] and decreases for any x 2 [x;x0]. Whilst the expected
utility for the honest provider has been raised to be equal to  , the ex-post utility
he received will be less (or more) than that in the ￿rst best if the realization of x
is small (or large) enough. This mechanism o⁄ers the provider with incentives to
treat patients with worse medical conditions.
7. CONCLUSION
Risk selection is an important concern in health policy. The health authority,
health insurance and private employers who purchase care services for their em-
ployees are all faced with risk selection challenges. In response, risk adjustment
16In section 4, density function is f(x). For the purpose of comparison here we rewrite it
as f(xj0). This does not change the results because both represent the distribution without
￿ upcoding￿behaviour.
20methods are introduced in the reimbursement for services. Whilst the risk adjust-
ment approach helps to ensure that the morbidity of individual patients is taken
into account, the health care providers under this payment arrangement have the
incentive to shift patients￿diagnostic codes to ones that yield a greater payo⁄ from
the purchasers. This upcoding behavior is feasible because of the genuine uncer-
tainty about inappropriate diagnoses.
In our framework, the purchaser uses some pieces of information to alleviate
the moral hazard problem. ACG Morbidity Index, which is developed based on
diagnostic information, is applied as a proxy for measuring morbidity burden and
hence, as the risk adjuster. Although the index is a stochastic variable due to
the in￿ uence of such factors as the uncertainty of medical conditions, the coding
inaccuracy and so forth, its realization can be measured by collecting health care
administrative data (e.g. ICD-9 codes). Another piece of information used in the
models is the distribution of the index. Based on past experiences we assumed this
pattern is common knowledge.
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the motivation for upcoding can be
removed if an appropriate contract is o⁄ered to the provider. Two contracts have
been developed: in the ￿rst contract the purchaser designs a payment scheme and
imposes appropriate treatment intensity as the regulatory instruments, and the
second contract is based only on the payment scheme. Both of the mechanisms o⁄er
the provider incentive to record diagnostic codes honestly. Under both incentive
mechanisms, the rewards that the honest providers receive are the same, which is
equal to the value of expected punishment, i.e.  (  > 0): The value of   depends
on how the society (i.e. the purchasers and the providers) evaluates the value of
potential punishment once the behaviour manipulating diagnostic codes is detected.
Therefore, in the sense of expected utility increase, both mechanisms have the same
incentive e⁄ect.
From the incentive point of view, the ￿rst contract is accompanied by reducing
the treatment intensity. This reduction may hurt the bene￿t from consuming health
care services. On the other hand, the transfer distortion and ex-post utility e⁄ect
21under the second contract will lead the resources to be allocated to the patients
with worse medical conditions.
In the sense of implementing contracts, however, we believe the mechanism
based on both the payment scheme and treatment intensity is superior. Under
this mechanism, the contract o⁄ered to the provider with ex-post utility U(t;y) is
equivalent to that o⁄ered under full information to a provider with ex-post utility
U(t;y) ￿  . The problem with the presence of moral hazard is therefore converted
into looking for solution to a problem under full information. As a result, the
distribution conditional upon the upcoding behaviour is excluded in the mechanism
design. The optimal payment scheme and treatment intensity depend only upon the
distribution without upcoding. Because the distribution without upcoding re￿ ects
the nature of medical conditions it can be determined on the basis of population
medical history.
The ￿rst contract requires that the treatment intensity must correspond to the
realization of morbidity index (i.e. x). This condition implicitly assumed that the
treatment intensity is observable. However, in practice, monitoring the intensity
is necessary to ensure the treatment synchronizes with the diagnostic information,
which will incur extra monitoring costs. The second mechanism is related to the
distribution conditional upon upcoding behavior. Under the mechanism, the pay-
ment scheme depends not only upon the distribution without upcoding but also
upon the conditional distribution, which is assumed to be known at the beginning
of the game. However, the provider in practice still has the discretion to shift the
conditional distribution through varying the degree of upcoding behavior, even af-
ter he has accepted the contract. This shift will result in the solution moving away
from the equilibrium.
APPENDIX









U (t;y)f (x)dx ￿ 0








The optimal solution satis￿es the functional derivative equations
￿$(x)
￿t(x) = 0 and
￿$(x)
￿y(x) = 0:Namely,
￿f (x) + ￿Ut (t;y)f (x) = 0 (1)





which indicates participation constraint is binding, i.e.
Z x
x
U (t;y)f (x)dx = 0 (3)
From Eq.2 we have




































where U ￿ U (t(x);y (x)) is the ex-post utility as x = x: And x ￿ 0 by assumption.


















































dx [Uyy (t;y) + byUty (t;y) + Ut (t;y)byy (t;y)]
+ dt




= ￿Ut (t;y)byx (x;y)




Uyy (t;y) + byy (t;y)
by
+ 2Uty (t;y) + byUtt (t;y)
￿










Uyy (t;y) + byUty (t;y) + Ut (t;y)byy (t;y)








￿ ￿Ut (t;y)byx (x;y) (8)
24Note that by assumption each term in the square bracket in 7 and 8 are negative.
Therefore, from 6 and 8, we have:
dy
dx
> 0 and hence
dt
dx
> 0 if byx (x;y) > 0
From 6 and 7, we have:
dt
dx
< 0 and hence
dy
dx
< 0 if byx (x;y) < 0
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us introduce a combined functional to ￿nd the






x [b(x;y) ￿ t]f (xj0)dx + ￿
R x
x U (t;y)f (xj1)dx
+￿
R x




The ￿rst order conditions are
￿$(x)
￿t = 0 and
￿$(x)
￿y(x) = 0:Namely,




by (x;y)f (xj0) + ￿Uy (t;y)f (xj1)






















f (xj0) ￿ f (xj1)
f (xj0)
(10)








f (xj1)dx + ￿
Z x
x
[f (xj0) ￿ f (xj1)]dx
Note that
R x
x f (xj0)dx =
R x




























f (xj0) ￿ f (xj1)
f (xj0)
(12)
































￿  = ￿
Z x
x
U (t;y)[f (xj0) ￿ f (xj1)]dx (14)























































Here we note that, from incentive compatibility constraint,
R x
x U (t;y)f (xj1)dx <
R x
x U (t;y)f (xj0)dx: Taking into account the fact that U (t;y) and 1
Ut(t;y) change
in the same direction, we have:









Therefore, both the participation constraint and incentive compatibility con-
straint are binding. The parameter ￿ and ￿; and trajectory t(x) and y (x) can be
determined by using the constraints in equality and the ￿rst order condition Eq.9
and 10.
To determine trajectories t(x) and y (x); let￿ s re￿ne Eq.9 and 10.
Eq.9 plus 10 yields:




Both constraints taking in equality imply that:
Z x
x
U (t;y)f (xj0)dx =   (16)
17The covariance between random variables ￿; ￿ is de￿ned as
cov (￿;￿) = E [(￿ ￿ E￿)(￿ ￿ E￿)] = E (￿￿) ￿ E￿E￿
27Trajectories t(x) and y (x) are determined by using the equation above.




[U (t;y) ￿  ]f (xj0)dx = 0
De￿ning a utility function:
W (t;y) ￿ U (t;y) ￿  
and note that Wt (t;y) ￿ Ut (t;y) and Wy (t;y) ￿ Uy (t;y): Hence the optimal
trajectories are determined by the equations below:
Z x
x
W (t;y)f (xj0)dx = 0
by (x;y) = ￿
Wy (t;y)
Wt (t;y)
Considering the discussion last section and noting that f (xj0) ￿ f (x) because
both represent the density function without upcoding behaviour, we see the ￿rst
best mechanism can be used in the case. Therefore, given the boundary condition
W ￿ U ￿   ￿ 0; all of the results from proposition 1 are achieved here.
Q.E.D.






> 0; there are
three possible relations between f (xj1) and f (xj0); as listed below:
1. f (xj1) > f (xj0) for any x 2 [x;x]
2. f (xj1) < f (xj0) for any x 2 [x;x]




> > > > <
> > > > :
< 1 if x 2 [x;x0)
= 1 if x = x0
> if x 2 (x0;x]








However, according to the de￿nition of density function, both sides must equal
1. Hence, the above cannot be true. By similar argument, case 2 cannot occur.
Therefore, only case 3 must hold.
Q.E.D.









U (t;Y )f(xj1)dx ￿ 0
Z x
x
U (t;Y )f(xj0)dx ￿
Z x
x
U (t;Y )f(xj1)dx +  
The ￿rst order condition is:








f (xj0) ￿ f (xj1)
f (xj0)
(17)
Using the same approach as that in the proof of proposition 2, we see ￿;￿ > 0:
Therefore, parameters ￿ and ￿; and trajectory t(x) can be determined by using
Eq.17 and the constraints hold with equality.
Next we examine the relation between the ￿rst best trajectory t￿ (x) and the
second best one tSB (x). Rewriting Eq.17, we have:
1
Ut (t;Y )






















We will show ￿ ￿ ￿ < 0 if x 6= x0; where x0 is the value discussed in appendix C.
Using the same approach as in the proof of proposition 1, we can show dt
dx > 0:
Considering this and the assumption Utt (t;Y ) < 0; we immediately learn that
1





monotonously increases in x: We also know from Lemma 12
that f (xj1) = f (xj0) if x = x0, which implies 1





= 0 at the











< 0 if x < x0
> 0 if x > x0
This combining with Lemma 12 and Eq.19 implies ￿ ￿ ￿ < 0 if x 6= x0:





Comparing Eq.18 with Eq.20, we therefore conclude:
tSB (x)
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
< t￿ (x) if x < x0
= t￿ (x) if x = x0
> t￿ (x) if x > x0
Q.E.D.
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